In Part 1, we looked at why interest rates are a blunt instrument when inflation is being driven partly by external supply shocks, and whether some of the burden of reducing household spending could be redirected into building equity or savings rather than simply increasing interest costs.
In Part 2, we look at what happens after the RBA changes interest rates: how quickly those decisions flow through the economy, why different effects arrive at different times, and why economists talk about transmission lags and monetary clocks.
Before we go any further, there is one small problem: monetary policy comes with its own language.
Economists and central bankers routinely talk about tightening, basis points, transmission lags, cash-flow channels and inflation expectations as though everyone uses these terms over breakfast.
Most people do not.
So before getting into the model, I want you to try the Monetary Jargon Generator below. It gives you a random piece of monetary-policy jargon, explains what it means in plain English and, where possible, gives you a simple everyday example. Once the terminology is stripped away, the underlying ideas are often much easier to understand.
The Monetary Jargon Generator
Economists have a remarkable ability to make simple ideas sound complicated. Click the button and collect some monetary-policy jargon of your own.
Click the button to speak like a central banker.
Understanding monetary jargon is important because it enables us to understand monetary policy. The RBA’s own modelling shows that household cash flow is only one channel through which monetary policy affects the economy. Interest rates also work through the exchange rate, saving and investment decisions, asset prices, credit conditions and business investment.
These effects do not occur immediately: the broader impact of a change in interest rates can take roughly one to two years to work through the economy. That means economic decisions taken during the term of one government may not fully show their effects until the term of another government. This is the main reason why we see politicians squabling and blaming each other.
This is precisely why attributing economic conditions at any particular moment entirely to the government of the day can oversimplify what is happening. The RBA refers to these delays as monetary-policy transmission lags or monetary clocks.
Australia exports energy, but imports the fuels that move the economy
Australia is a net energy exporter overall because of coal and LNG, while being a net importer of oil and refined petroleum products.
The RBA says almost 80 per cent of domestic demand for refined products such as petrol, diesel and jet fuel is met through imports, much of it supplied by Asian refineries that themselves rely heavily on Middle Eastern crude.
That means higher global energy prices can improve parts of Australia's export income while simultaneously raising costs for households and businesses. Diesel is particularly important because it is embedded throughout freight, mining, agriculture and production.
An international oil shock can therefore feed into inflation first through petrol and diesel, then more gradually through transport, food and other input costs.
Why transmission lags matter
Oil shocks and interest-rate changes do not travel through the economy at the same speed. Fuel can add to inflation in days or weeks. Headline inflation can move within a quarter or two. Freight, food and services can take longer. Monetary policy can start affecting mortgage payments relatively quickly, but its broader effect on demand, output and inflation develops over a much longer period.
The RBA's own August work supports the idea that there are multiple clocks rather than one single lag. It said the earlier 2026 rate increases had not yet had their full effect, while its financial-conditions chapter noted that cash-rate increases can take roughly three months to flow through to scheduled mortgage payments. Those are different stages of transmission.
What my model shows
Economic commentary can become very boring and very noisy remarkably quickly. On any given day, economists may be warning about inflation, predicting more rate rises, forecasting a slowdown or insisting that tighter policy still has further to run. Some commentary becomes political almost immediately, while other analysis imports overseas narratives or theories that do not necessarily fit the Australian economy.
The problem is not that these views should be ignored. The problem is that many readers see the headline, absorb the framing and form a conclusion before they ever get to the underlying economics. Mediahouses often design the headlines to attract attention, and compresses complex economic stories into simple narratives.
They frequently do not address the missing mechanism in their analysis: What is causing the inflation? How quickly is that pressure moving through the economy? What part is coming from domestic demand, and what part is coming from an external shock such as oil? And refuse to discuss how how much of the effect of earlier interest-rate rises is still working its way through the system?
That is why I built my own model. Rather than treating every increase in inflation as if it has the same cause, the model deliberately separates the RBA’s published baseline, an oil-price deviation from that baseline, and the delayed effect of monetary policy. That allows us to ask the question that matters most: is the extra inflation we are trying to suppress coming from domestic demand, or from an external cost shock?
Testing the model against recent RBA graphs
I compared the model's logic with the RBA’s August 2026 Statement on Monetary Policy. The model’s baseline inflation path follows the RBA’s published outlook, while the scenario layer tests what happens when oil prices and interest-rate assumptions are changed.
I then made the model more adverse is in its treatment of oil. The RBA’s central outlook assumes some conflict-related cost pressures ease through early 2027 and begin contributing to lower inflation around the middle of the year. The scenario shown here asks what happens if oil prices remain materially higher for longer.
The model also assumes that monetary policy works with a substantial delay. That is consistent with the RBA’s broader view that the full effects of interest-rate changes take time to move through household spending, investment, employment and inflation. However, the precise 18-month peak used in the dashboard is a modelling assumption rather than an official RBA estimate.
Likewise, the model’s estimate of how much a sustained rate increase lowers CPI is an internal calibration used to compare scenarios. It should be read as an illustrative sensitivity rather than a Reserve Bank forecast.
RBA November 2026 outlook: what might the headlines look like next?
The November RBA forecast now incorporates higher energy prices and stronger inflation pressures than were assumed in August. Move through the timeline to see the kinds of economic stories that could accompany each forecast milestone.
Sources: RBA Statement on Monetary Policy, November 2026 and ABS Consumer Price Index, September 2026 .
Why 2027 could be the turning year
The RBA’s August forecast effectively treated 2027 as a transition year. Its central case was that the inflation shock would begin to fade, unit labour cost growth would moderate, productivity would start improving and the economy would move back toward balance. GDP growth was expected to recover gradually from 1.4 per cent at the end of 2026 to 1.5 per cent by June 2027 and 1.6 per cent by December 2027.
In other words, 2026 was expected to be the difficult adjustment year, while 2027 was when the benefits of that adjustment would begin to appear.
But that improvement was conditional.
The RBA’s August forecast assumed oil prices would fall substantially from their 2026 highs and that conflict-related cost pressures would gradually fade. It also assumed subdued demand would eventually bring the economy back into balance.
That is why my model places more importance on the assumption that international oil prices matters much more . If energy prices remain elevated for longer than the RBA assumed, inflation could take longer to fall even while higher interest rates continue weakening demand. Even sound domestic economic policy may struggle to fully offset the effects of a prolonged external energy shock.
The September decision already showed that this risk was becoming more important. When the RBA raised the cash rate to 4.60 per cent on 29 September, it said global energy prices were much higher than assumed in the August forecasts and that some of the previously identified upside inflation risks were materialising.
So the real question for 2027 is whether external cost pressures fade quickly enough for the delayed effects of monetary tightening to reduce inflation without weakening growth more than the RBA originally expected.